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ABSTRACT

Acts of violence toward multinational corporations have
important consequences for the way these companies will need to
structure their approach to internationalbusiness. This Article
proposes four contributions that corporations can make to
sustainable peace. By incorporating sustainable peace as a
business objective, multinational corporations may be able to
blend extant corporate governance principles with a goal that
can significantly contribute to the reduction of violence in
society.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In May 2002, as President Bush was preparing to embark on a
trip to Germany in an attempt to convince European countries to
back tougher action against Iraq, large protests sprung up in the city
of Berlin.' The fear of unrest prompted the German government to
call over 10,000 police, the largest contingent ever assembled, into the
city. 2 A large composite protest group composed of 240 smaller
organizations, including such diverse ideologies as anarchists and

1.
Toby Helm, Bush Protests Off to Early Start, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH,
May 22, 2001, at B1.
2.
Id.
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environmentalists, which referred to itself as the Axis of Peace (in
response to the labeling by President Bush of Iran, Iraq, and North
Korea as the "Axis of Evil" in his 2002 State of the Union Address),
targeted corporations with U.S. ties in order to express their
disapproval of the current U.S. foreign policy.3 Police had earlier
thwarted an attempted firebombing on a Wal-Mart store in Bonn, and
they feared further attacks against the retail giant, as well as against
4
McDonald's restaurants and DaimlerChrysler offices.
Of course, such protests are not limited to those groups
expressing displeasure with U.S. policy.
In January 2002,
Argentinian protesters ransacked Spanish and U.S. banks, and a
McDonald's restaurant in Buenos Aires. 5 These violent acts arose
from an initially-peaceful protest aimed at the economic reforms of
the new and unstable Argentinian government in a financial system
6
where most of the investment is obtained from foreign sources.
The above examples point toward an increasing trend in current
global politics: the targeting of local branches of international
corporations, especially U.S. corporations, to express disapproval with
the policies of the corporations' home or host country, or both. U.S.
corporations, such as Wal-Mart, McDonald's, Nike, and Coca-Cola,
are prime targets because of their size, business practices, and the
way that these companies symbolize the capitalist free market to the
rest of the world. The problem has become so troublesome and
widespread that before the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec
City, a McDonald's restaurant in that city shut down for the duration
of the event and removed all identifying signs in an attempt to escape
7
now-routine protester outbursts.
These acts of violence toward multinational corporations have
important consequences for the way these companies will need to
structure their approach to international business. It has thus
become apparent that companies need to assure that their
international business relationships are profitable on both sides.
This has become important in this era of increasingly destabilized
and fluid international relationships, where the perceived dominance
of one country leaves its multinational corporations subject to violent
reprisals. The companies that are likely to be targeted are often the
largest and most visible, and those that are also perceived as being

3.
4.

Id.
Id.

5.
Anthony Faiola, Argentine Peso Quickly Sinks After Government Lets it
Float; Protests Against Economic Changes Turn Violent in Capital, WASH. POST, Jan.
13, 2002, at A23.
6.
Id.

7.

Protesters in Quebec Tear Down Part of Barricade,Throw Objects at Police,

ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 21, 2001, at 6.
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uncaring about the conditions that they create in their host country.
This has been evidenced by the ongoing debate over "sweat shop"
labor that has resulted in protests against Nike both in the United
States and abroad.8 Therefore, it becomes vital for these companies
to strive to foster peaceful relations in the countries in which they
conduct business and to use their influence in a positive way to
attempt to create a peaceful environment in which to conduct
beneficial business relations.
Violence is not limited to the international front, however. The
United States has one of the highest rates of workplace violence in
the world, with over 2 million instances reported.9 In 2000, 11
percent of the 5,914 fatal work injuries experienced in the United
States were due to some form of violence.' 0 The increasing pressure
of a global recession has ignited new rounds of workplace violence
throughout the world. In Japan, the sagging economy has led to
rapidly-increasing instances of "bullying" of white-collar workers, as
the idea of an individual remaining with one company for his or her
entire working career is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. 11
These incidences take a toll on the workers themselves as well as
on the countries' economies. In the United States alone, instances of
workplace violence are estimated to cost U.S. companies over four
billion dollars each year. 12 In Germany, the direct psychological
effects of workplace violence are estimated to cost over USD $112,000
for every company with 1,000 workers. 13 The indirect costs are
estimated to be around USD $58,000.14
In previous work, we argued that a link exists between corporate
governance and the reduction of violence. 15 In this Article, we further
explore that link, focusing on how corporations can work toward the
16
goal of reduction of violence in the societies in which they operate.

8.
Nicholas Stein, No Way Out, FORTUNE, Jan. 20, 2003, at 102.
9.
Detis T. DuLart, Violence in the Workplace, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT, Dec. 2001, at http://www.ojp.usoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdfIvw99.pdf.
10.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES IN 2000 (2001), at http://www.bis.gov/iif/oslwc/cfoi/cfnr0007/pdf.
11.
DUNCAN CHAPPELL & V. DIMARTINO, VIOLENCE AT WORK (Int'l Lab. Org.,
2d ed. 2000).
12.
Id. at 150.
13.
Id.

14.
Id.
15.
Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation in
Fostering Sustainable Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389 (2002).
16.
See, e.g., Caryn L. Beck-Dudley & Steven H. Hanks, On Virtue and Peace:
Creating a Workplace Where People Can Flourish, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427
(2003); Frances E. Zollers & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Workplace Violence and
Security: Are There Lessons for Peacemaking?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449 (2003);
Dana Muir, Groundings of Voice in Employee Rights, 36 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485
(2003); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, Gender Voice and Correlations
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Here, we pose the question of how well-suited various corporate
governance regimes are to face these complexities, and how they may
cope in ways that are consistent with their fundamental principles.
We focus on the corporate governance regimes of the United States,
Germany, and Japan. A common denominator of the political entities
addressed is a commitment to a political regime of democracy. At
least in the post-World War II era, and particularly in the post-Cold
War era, all of these countries have been committed to democratic
governments and principles.
This Article is thus organized as follows. Part II outlines our
thesis that corporations are in a position to make contributions to
peace in society because of shifting political balances of power. Part
III analyzes comparative models of corporate governance and
considers the extent to which contemporary corporate governance

with Peace, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527 (2003); Thomas W. Dunfee & Timothy L.
Fort, Corporate Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, and the Adapted Firm, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 563 (2003); Tara J. Radin, 700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of
Corporate Citizenship, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 619 (2003);
0. Lee Reed,
Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in Property, Liberty, and Corporate Governance, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (2003); Michael J. O'Hara, Governing for Genuine Profit,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765 (2003); Thomas K. Capozzoli, The OrganizationalModel
for Workplace Security, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 781 (2003); Jeannette Jackson &
Maria Coolican, Healthy Organizationsand the Link to Peaceful Societies: Strategiesfor
Implementing OrganizationalChange, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (2003); Lee A.
Tavis, Novartis and the UN. Global Compact Initiative, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735
(2003); Marina v.N. Whitman, Corporate Governance and Sustainable Peace: An
Insider's View, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 723 (2003); Linda Groat, Building Values
into Corporate Space, Presentation at 2002 William Davidson Institute Conference,
Corporate Governance and Sustainable Peace (November 22-24, 2002) [hereinafter
2002 William Davidson Institute Conference]; Jane Dutton, Building Compassion
Capacity in Organizations as a Pathway for Fostering Peace, Presentation at 2002
William Davidson Institute Conference; Kim Cameron, Organizational Virtuousness
and Peace: The Case of Forgiveness, Presentation at 2002 William Davidson Institute
Conference; Gretchen Spreitzer, Implications of Organizational Leadership and
Employee Voice for Peace, Presentation at 2002 William Davidson Institute
Conference; Frances J. Milliken, Understanding Dynamics of Voice and Silence in
Organizations, Presentation at 2002 William Davidson Institute Conference; Tom
McCormick, Ethics and Compliance at Dow, Presentation at 2002 William Davidson
Institute Conference; James Walsh & Joshua Margolis, Misery Loves Company:
Whether Social Initiatives by Business? Presentation at 2002 William Davidson
Institute Conference; Tara Rangarajan, Defining the Role of the Corporation in
Sustainable Peace, Presentation at 2002 William Davidson Institute Conference; Eric
Orts, From Corporate Social Responsibility to Global Citizenship, Presentation at 2002
William Davidson Institute Conference; C.K. Prahalad, Enabling the Poor to Move into
the Market Economy, Presentation at 2002 William Davidson Institute Conference;
Susan Finston, The Role of Intellectual Property as Part of a Rule of Law Culture
Needed for Economic Growth and Political Stability in the Developing World,
Presentation at 2002 William Davidson Institute Conference; George Siedel, The Role
of Business Negotiation and Dispute Resolution Processes in Contributing to
Sustainable Peace, Presentation at 2002 William Davidson Institute Conference.
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models may be adapted to consider peace as a goal they should
achieve. Concluding remarks follow in Part IV

II.

THE ROLE OF BUSINESS AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE

It can be difficult to understand how corporations might be
engaged in issues of building democracy and sustainable peace.
Economic imperatives and competitive pressures seem to make
consideration of such political and moral goals beyond the scope of
corporate responsibility. Historically, there may be some justification
for this reticence, but it is important to see that the 21st century may
not replicate the geopolitical conditions of the previous several
centuries. In large part, this may be due to the balances of power
that exist among various institutions including nation-states and
multinational corporations, and the relationship corporations have
with governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Thus, this Section (1) addresses the contemporary geopolitical set of
conditions that add complexity to the balances of power; (2) delineates
the newly-emerging alternate forms of democracies that may account
for this reality; and (3) articulates various reasons why these
alternatives are important to sustainable peace. It then suggests how
corporations might foster the stabilizing benefits of democracy, as
well as how they might unwittingly undermine those benefits.
A. The Contemporary Context: Balance of Power and the State
Particularly in developed countries, there can be an
understandable tendency to think of corporations as private
organizations with relatively-autonomous authority through state
chartering. Under this conception, businesses may act to maximize
profits, provided they do not violate laws enforced by a government.
There is confidence in this model because, at least in first-world
countries, governments have the capability to enact and enforce
regulations. It is not so clear, however, whether governments of
developing countries have the same power vis-a-vis corporations,
particularly when considering the transcendence of multinational
corporations beyond geographical borders.
The comfortable and
traditional characterization of corporations as profit maximizers
within the confines of the law might be insufficient in today's world.
A key reason for the concern is the increasing complexity of the
world in light of the number of states that now exist, the proliferation
of NGOs, the power of multinational corporations, and perhaps most
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profoundly, the changing nature of the nation-state. 17
In an
ambitious book, constitutional law scholar Philip Bobbitt examines
the changes in the state throughout history.' 8 Bobbitt argues that
the construction of legal constitutions has historically resulted from
the necessities of war. 19 Implicit in this argument is that basic legal
frameworks rest on balances of power to assure competitive
advantage and sustainable peace. 20 As creations of law, corporations
are thus inevitably affected by factors of war and peace.
Bobbitt traces primarily-European history to describe transitions
from princely states to kingly states, territorial states, state-nations,
and finally to nation-states. 21 The key determinant accounting for
each transition was a need to organize society to compete effectively
with military advances and challenges. 22 For example, Bobbitt notes
that prior to Napoleon's rule, most armies were relatively small,
consisting of fewer than 25,000 men. 23 Armies were professional and
therefore expensive, so warfare was largely about avoiding their
destruction. 24 Napoleon's leadership was an exception with his desire
to create clashes in opposing countries to break morale and
25
ultimately induce them to surrender extant economic resources.
The French Revolution, however, gave rise to popular involvement in
politics, and by 1794, Napoleon took advantage of popular passion to

17.
See generally PHILIP BOBBIr, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND
THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002).
18.
Id.
19.
See generally id.
20.
See generally id.
21,
Id. at 215-16. Bobbitt describes the differentiation as follows:
The princely state promised external security, the freedom from domination
and interference by foreign powers.
The kingly state inherited this
responsibility and added the promise of internal stability. The territorial state
added the promise of expanding material wealth, to which the state-nation
further added the civil and political rights of popular sovereignty. To all these
responsibilities the nation-state added the promise of providing economic
security and public goods to its people. The failure of the Soviet Union to live
up to this expectation, as much as any other cause, contributed to its
delegitimation in the eyes of its nation. Very simply, the strategic innovations
of the Long War will make it increasingly difficult for the nation-state to fulfill
its responsibilities.
That will account for its delegitimation. The new
constitutional order that will supercede the nation-state will be one that copes
better with these new demands of legitimization, by redefining the
fundamental compact on which the assumption of legitimate power is based.
Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

216-19.
162.
187.
187.
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create massive armies of almost 1.2 million men who, although
26
untrained, were able to overwhelm smaller, professional armies.
Warfare required popular sacrifice and therefore required a
different kind of political apparatus as well as more-detailed laws to
27
describe the basis for government, taxation, and conscription.
Thus, while Napoleon is known for his military characteristics of
ambitious and strategic innovation, he is also famous for his ability
to obligate the mass of persons to the French state. Among this vast
people various groups from the bourgeoisie were employed in the
service of the state; for their members there were lower taxes extracted
by France from her conquered neighbors; working men found in the
state an employer of last resort-the army (whose mass employment
would not have been possible under the strategic and tactical
constraints of the armies of the territorial state); and for every class a
new meritocracy arose that measured status according to services
28
rendered to the State.

According to Bobbitt's thesis, this example is one of law relating to
military strategy and military strategy to law because they mutually
29
reinforce the state's capacity for warfare.
In the 20th century, this relationship manifested itself in the
nation-state, which Bobbitt argues drew its legitimacy-a core
concept necessary to any state-from its ability to satisfy the welfare
of the constituents it governed and from whom it demanded
sacrifices. 30 Coming out of World War I, there were three contenders
for the nation-state system that would best accomplish constituent
31
welfare: fascism, communism, and parliamentary democracy.
Bobbitt views the era of 1914-1990 as "The Long War," fought to
settle the dispute regarding which of these alternatives best benefited
the welfare of citizens with parliamentary democracy successively
defeating fascism (in World War II) and communism (in the Cold
War).32 Yet, the conclusion of each "epochal war" also brings with it a
new set of challenges. Out of the Cold War, Bobbitt argues that a
new kind of state is emerging-the market state-whose legitimacy is
not based on providing welfare for its citizens (particularly in the
form of welfare entitlements, pensions, etc.) but whose rasion d'etre is
to provide opportunities for its citizens through market opportunities
and education. 33 These opportunities allow individuals to participate

26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
U.S. policies).

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

175.
175.
539.
5-17.
5-6.
24-25.
24-64.
222 (citing in particular the U.K. policies of Tony Blair as well as the
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and to compete effectively in a global economy. This environment
recognizes the proliferation of nongovernmental powers, which
although undermining the traditional nation-state, insist on respect
for human rights regardless of the nation-state's historical stand. It
further recognizes the increasing power of multinational corporations
regardless of the nationthat may provide economic opportunity
34
state's traditional economic regulations.
Bobbitt identifies three models to describe the way these market
states are taking shape. They are the U.S. model, the German model,
and the Japanese model. More will be said about the specific
governance regimes these models reflect. If Bobbitt is correct, the
question becomes whether there is a way for these market-state
systems to evolve so that they may (1) confront violent threats to
them collectively (as through challenges from terrorism or from nondemocratic regimes), and (2) provide economic innovation shaped
through law to make key border-crossing institutions, such as
multinational corporations, instruments of sustainable peace.
B. The ParliamentaryModels: Germany, Japan,and the United
States
In general, democracies operate according to the wishes of a body
of citizens electing representatives to govern them. In Spencer
Weart's historical analysis, a democracy is defined first in terms of a
republic. 35 A republic's defining feature is that "political decisions
[are] made by a body of citizens who have equal rights. '36 These
decisions are made in light of "public contestation" of choices with
political officials, who are accountable to the citizens for their
actions. 37 To have public contestations, there must be free political
expression, rule of law, and toleration of politically-dissenting
minorities. 38 The exact implementation of these features can vary
significantly. Weart also differentiates between oligarchic republics
and democratic republics. An oligarchic republic features voting by
only one-third of citizens, whereas democratic republics feature
voting by two-thirds of citizens.3 9 Interestingly, oligarchic republics
rarely make war on other oligarchic republics and, according to

34.

Id. at 222-29.

SPENCER R. WEART, NEVER AT WAR: WHY DEMOCRACIES WILL NOT FIGHT
35.
ONE ANOTHER 11 (1998).

Id. at 11.
36.
37.
Id.
Id. This designation of democracy has been applied to situations where
38.
two-thirds of men vote. It may be desirable to think more broadly of citizenship as
democracies developed in the 20th century with increased universality of suffrage.
Id. at 12.
39.
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Weart's analysis, democratic republics never make war on other
40
democratic republics.
The specific characteristics of equal rights, toleration of dissent,
voting, and free expression suggest that there is a different character
of political solidarity in a democracy than might exist in other kinds
of political regimes. Indeed, at the heart of Weart's analysis of
republicanism is the idea of political culture. 4 1 A republican political
culture, and particularly a democratic political culture, not only
embraces ideas of equal rights, public contestation, and toleration of
political dissent, but also values the political process and resolves
disputes among citizens by negotiation and mutual accommodation
42
rather than by coercion.
Benjamin Barber builds upon similar notions when he argues
that democracy requires the foundation of civil society. 43 This
foundation is not built quickly as the evolution of democracy in
Britain and the United States shows, but rather slowly; nearly three
quarters of a millennium passed between the Magna Carta to the
Declaration of Independence. 44 As Barber argues, civil society is not
about voting and buying and selling, it is about an environment
"where we talk with neighbors about a crossing guard, plan a benefit
for our community school, discuss how our church or synagogue can
shelter the homeless, or organize a summer softball league for our
children. '45
Civil society, therefore, provides a foundation for
democracy because it trains people to organize themselves to solve
public issues in a non-coercive way on the basis of respect,
persuasion, and negotiation-the hallmarks of a republican political
culture. These activities are not about political organizing as much
as they are about being part of a small group within which
individuals are empowered to affect the norms of the community, or
what is also known as a mediating institution. 46 These activities and
institutions are "public" just as the government is public, but they

40.
Id. at 14. Weart provides a caveat that these republics must be "wellestablished." By this, he means that toleration of dissent has persisted for at least
three years. Id. at 21. He indicates that the differentiation feature between oligarchic
and democratic republics is that oligarchic republics suppress a "crucial domestic
enemy" whereas democracies are more embracing of them. Id. at 18.
41.
Id. at 15.
42.
See id. The designation of these features being particularly prevalent in
democracies is the Authors' addition to Weart's argument.
43.
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS MCWORLD:
TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD 276 (1995).

How GLOBALIZATION AND

44.
45.

See id. at 278.
Id. at 281.

46.

See PETER BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE

(1977) (noting that in small, mediating structures, human beings find their public
face).
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"make no claim to exercise a monopoly on legitimate coercion. '47
That is, mediating institutions do not seek merely their own selfadvancement as a for-profit corporation might, but instead, they are
concerned with issues concerning the common good. 48
There is a direct link to peace resulting from these societies
because leaders who deal with equals at home by non-coercive
negotiation and compromise are likely to deal with similarly-inclined
leaders of other nations through negotiation and compromise. 49 This
does not mean that democratic (or oligarchic republican) cultures are
incapable of warfare; but rather that they do not engage in warfare
with similar kinds of political cultures. 50 Thus, democratic societies
can be defined by public contestation, equal rights, free expression,
and
of
representatives,
election
compromise,
negotiation,
accountability of those representatives to voters. Underlying those
societies is civil society where people voluntarily engage in quests for
public goods that define their mediating institutions, but which also
reach beyond special interests to embrace the common good.
This kind of political system has, according to Bobbitt, defeated
fascism and communism in the The Long War. 51 Yet, with the end of
The Long War, the creation of market-states poses new kinds of
Significantly, all three
variations for optimal organization.
variations-the German, Japanese, and U.S. models-provide for a
system where economic transactions of multinational corporations
have a central role.
As noted above, Bobbitt has coined the term "market-state" to
describe a new kind of state that is emerging. Bobbitt argues that
market-states make the maximization of opportunities for citizens the
basis of their legitimacy. 5 2 But each differs according to how it
creates those opportunities. In the United States, it means
providing infrastructure (including intangible infrastructure like
education and the means of enforcing agreements) and relying on
private enterprise to maximize the abundance of consumer choice and
minimize the costs to the consumer of exercising choice. In Tokyo, by
contrast, maximizing opportunity means protecting domestic industries
so that future generations will have a full array of employment
opportunities, subsidizing research and development so that future
opportunities for innovation will be practicably exploitable, and
restricting the import of capital so that the government remains in
control of its capital allocation. In Berlin, maximizing opportunity
means social and economic equality among citizens so that
opportunities available to communities, workers and future generations

47.

BARBER, supra note 43, at 281.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
WEART, supra note 35, at 16.
Id. at 16-17
BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 24 and accompanying text.
Id. at 669.
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are maximized rather than maximizing the short-term profits of
53
shareholders.

Bobbitt characterizes the differing models used by democracies as (1)
the Entrepreneurial Model; (2) the Mercantile Model; and (3) the
54
Managerial Model.
The "Entrepreneurial Model," which Bobbitt uses to characterize
the U.S. approach but which is not used exclusively by the United
States, is a model that stresses autonomy, individual achievement,
and consumption where "citizens of these states 'invent' their
citizenships, identifying themselves with those subgroups within the
state with whom they share a consumption pattern."5 5 Labor
relations in this model tend to be confrontational, and immigration is
generally welcomed. 56 Thus, the Entrepreneurial Model is more
libertarian and less socially cohesive, with protections of citizens
coming more from media exposure of wrongdoing than from
government. 57 This, however, exacerbates the problems of social
cohesion that every market-state faces.
This model also stresses guarantees for human rights, free press,
and political dissent, which tend to support individualism. 58 The
Entrepreneurial Model has proponents outside of the English59
speaking world including, for example, Thailand and Peru.
In the "Mercantile Model," which Bobbitt uses to characterize the
Japanese approach but which is not exclusively used by the Japanese,
immigration is discouraged in favor of maintaining "cultural
homogeneity," and labor relations tend to be more familial.6 0 This
model also "retain[s] conscription for military service (though with
force levels vastly reduced from those of the twentieth century),
affirmative action for certain social groups, and varying degrees of
state control of the media." 61 The Mercantile Model provides that
human rights are more communitarian rather than individualistic
and that "harmony rather than division" and "respect and reverence
are a truer expression of its cultural values. ' 62 These states,
63
therefore, "attempt to minimize the public expression of opposition."
Finally, Bobbitt's third model, the '"Managerial Model,"
characterizes the German approach, although it is not exclusively

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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Id. at 283.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 671.
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See id. at 292-93.
Id. at 675.
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Id. at 670.
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German. This model also retains conscription for military service,
affirmative action, and some control of the state media. 64 With
regard to labor relations, the Managerial Model "is ambivalent: open
'65
to 'guest workers' but hostile to new citizens.
From the snapshots of these models, predictions can be made
about some of the salient features of corporate governance systems
that these models would promote. The Entrepreneurial Model would
stress agility subject to free choices. 66 Thus, an underpinning legal
infrastructure of this model would stress transparency, fluid labor
movement, and a predominant emphasis on protecting investment
capital. 67 Indeed, these are features of the U.S. model. Yet, the 2002
corporate scandals demonstrate that this model also runs great risks
of insufficiently accomplishing its goals. In 2002, the United States
found that corporate executives and boards could be opaque rather
than transparent with devastating effects for investors as well as
employees.
The Mercantile market-state typically has a strong central
government that partners with business concerns in order to enhance
national industries and subsidize crucial research and development
while deemphasizing consumption.6 8 Social cohesion is maintained
by suppressing income disparities and subsidizing public housing and
access to education with the important proviso, according to Bobbitt,
that these benefits are available only for those who are eager to
work. 69 Mercantile market-states, such as Singapore, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and South Korea, have had impressive growth, although
their efficiency and productivity levels are more in the range of those
of Egypt, Greece, Syria, and Cameroon.70 Thus, the Mercantile Model
faces the challenges of
opening up domestic markets to foreign competition; reforming the
banking sector to bring greater scrutiny to credit transactions; allowing
access to cheaper credit for smaller firms that are usually restricted to
relatively high priced domestic finance and letting the cost of capital to
dominant firms rise . . . the Korean Model is characterized by the
concentration of power in four great companies (Samsung, Hyndai,
Lucky-Goldstar, and Daewoo).... In Japan, the largest six companies
account for over half the total assets of all listed enterprises.
Furthermore, some three-quarters of all shares are mutually held
71
between companies and their financial institutions.
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From this, it can be predicted that the Mercantile Model will
encourage a corporate governance system that is less concerned with
transparency and its concomitant fluidity and more focused on social
cohesion. 72 In such a system, one would expect tight, opaque control
of capital with an offsetting corporate culture stressing loyalty to a
74
corporate community.7 3 Indeed, these are features of this model.
Yet, the 1990s show that this model also brings with it significant
limitations on creativity and growth, which can undermine the
corporate goals. Lifetime employment may not be achievable under
this system, and capital investment returns may be dampened. 75
The Managerial market-state, according to Bobbitt, "consists of
three basic elements: free and open markets within a regional trading
framework, a government that provides a social safety net and
manages a stringent monetary policy, and a socially cohesive
society." 76 Protections are provided for ownership of private property,
but ownership also must contribute to the public good. 77 Labor and
management are required to share power on corporate boards. 78 This
system creates the "stakeholder company," that attempts to balance
all of the actors affected by a corporate action, although corporate
ownership is typically closely held through a centralized commercial
bank. 79 Bobbitt describes the goal of the Managerial Model as being
that of social equality whereas the goal of the Mercantile Model is
social stability.80
Governmental intervention tends to be more
aligned with labor in the Managerial Model as opposed to capital in
the Mercantile Model. 8 ' Although cohesion is also as important for
the Managerial Model as it is for the Mercantile Model, the states
following the Managerial Model, according to Bobbitt, tend to pay
productive workers well and provide generous welfare benefits for
those who do not have a job.8 2 Beyond Germany, practitioners of the
83
Managerial Model include India, Turkey, and Egypt.
It follows that corporate governance regimes under a Managerial
Model would encourage long-term goals of justice and consensuallyendorsed notions by the affected stakeholders.8 4 This system would
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be fortified by equipping stakeholders, particularly employees, with
power to influence decisions. 85 In fact, this is a hallmark of the
Managerial Model. 86 Yet, this approach also limits creativity and,
paradoxically, limits the influence of the actors affected because the
number of actors is so large that a delegation of responsibility is
inevitable.8 7 Thus, it is questionable whether this model can achieve
its goals.
Admittedly, there is not a perfect system; any organizational and
political theory will carry with it contradictory elements. Yet, there
are at least three reasons for why each model needs to be open to
influences from each other as well as to those other models that
attempt an overarching synthesis.
First, each model is potentially a target of terrorism.
For
example, Japan suffered from attacks via sarin gas and the United
States suffered via the attacks of September 11, 2001. If a sense of
justice mitigates some of the passions that might trigger such an
attack, then each system needs to consider how to mitigate its
weaknesses. This is not to argue that mitigating weaknesses will
prevent terrorism or that the weaknesses caused terrorism. It is hard
to see, for instance, how the better enforcement of generally accepted
accounting principles and Securities and Exchange regulations had
anything to do with the horrific events of September 11.
Yet,
improving the perception of the justness of capitalism and democracy
may help moderate social frustration.
Second, each model contains concerns for its own constituents.
As Bobbitt argues,
each model must contend with its own sort of alienation: the lowest
paid workers in the United States are vastly worse off than high wage
earners, while the unemployed in Europe can get by on welfare benefits
alone but have little prospect of a job. By contrast, the Mercantile
Model maintains artificially high employment rates, at wages that
reflect far less disparity between the highest and lowest paid. The
unavoidable cost is in productivity and efficiency, which sets the stage
88
for a new kind of alienation, that of the young from the old.

Finally, the framework implicit in this tri-partite delineation is that
to prevent the models from becoming too ideological and competitive
it is to be hoped that informal private networks that cross international
lines-for example, the large multinational corporations developed in
the twentieth century, or the extensive social networks developed by
overseas Chinese in East Asia and the United States, or global
nongovernmental organizations-will supply the links necessary to
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prevent the growing divergence of the three models of the market89
state.

The next question is how to accomplish this. Given the realities that
the major governing paradigms are variations of democracy, it seems
appropriate to examine the benefits that democracy may offer as well
as corporate interaction with democratic institutions.
C. Benefits of Democracy
Immanuel Kant thought that free peoples were inherently
peaceful. 90 The historical record, however, is mixed; democracies can
be as warlike as any other regime. 91 Yet, the fact remains that
democratic countries do not fight each other. Spencer Weart reviews
historical data and establishes the claim that "well-established
democracies have never made war on one another. '' 92 Corroborating
that claim, Dean Baps studied wars fought since 1500 and found no
wars (involving at least 50,000 troops or fought to cause territorial
transfer, a change in government, or eradication of a state) had
occurred between freely-elected, independent governments. 93 Three
reasons for this have been offered.
First, democratic republics are
more pluralistic than
authoritarian regimes. 94 The mediating institutions that proliferate
in civil society cut across various social ties so that no one group's
anger can automatically lead to belligerence. 95 The multiple ties any
one person might feel toward a particular neighborhood, church, or
political party create an internal check on political processes and
make it more difficult for a central authority to claim the need to go
96
to war to vindicate the interests of a particular group.
Second, Weart writes that the theory "that republicans generally
behave more peacefully toward other nations than do autocrats has
been confirmed about as reliably as anything can be in statistical
studies of human communities." 9 7 In a democracy, a leader has little
choice but to compromise, and this leadership style tends to extend to
those outside of one's borders, assuming that a preference for
negotiation also exists on the other side. 98
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In order for Weart to make his argument about the benefits of
democracy vis-A-vis peace, he creates a few basic definitions. These
definitions are helpful in beginning the process of transferring
democratic principles to a corporate context. Weart argues that the
distinguishing features of a republican culture are equal rights
among citizens and the toleration of dissent. 99 Moreover, a culture
does not become an established republic simply by a declaration;
instead, to meet this classification, toleration of dissent must have
persisted for at least three years. 10 0
Thus, one way businesses might be able to contribute to peace is
to support the establishment of democratic regimes wherever they do
business.1 0 1 This would require more than rhetoric, it would also
require support of equal rights and tolerance of dissent. Even if a
corporation cannot nudge a political regime toward democracy, it can
implement some of the practices that define a democracy in its own
governance structure. 10 2 By doing so, it may well provide a model for
democratic-like attributes that could spill over into the political
10 3
culture and nourish experiments in democratic decision-making.
D. The Role for the Corporation
1. The Paradox of Globalization and Democracy
Benjamin Barber has argued that democracy is under attack
from two very different sources. One source is Jihad, which typically
is thought in terms of Islamic extremism, but which Barber argues is
a metaphor for all parochial groups reacting against globalization. 104
The other source is McWorld, which transcends traditional borders
and boundaries to link people together in a quest for consuming goods
and achieving profitability. As different as they are,

third reason is not so flattering. Weart argues that a country that is not republican
can be characterized by a democratic republic as an "outgroup" that is "inherently
treacherous and aggressive." Id. There is an extensive literature demonstrating that
violence often accompanies the characterization of another group of people as an
"outgroup." Thus, it is important to recognize that democratic republics are not
themselves more peaceful, but they may be more peaceful toward like-minded political
regimes. See id.
99.
Id. at 15.
100.
Id. at 20.
101.
See generally id.
102.
See generally id.
103.
Fort & Schipani, supra note 15, at 434 (noting anthropological studies of
peaceful societies that have characteristics of face-to-face interaction, non-hierarchical
decision-making, gender equity, being relatively small in population, and the practicing
of non-violent dispute resolution).
104.
See BARBER, supra note 43.
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Jihad and McWorld have this in common: they both make war on the
sovereign nation-state and thus undermine the nation-state's
Each eschews civil society and belittles
democratic institutions.
democratic
seeks alternative
citizenship,
neither
democratic
10 5
institutions. Their common thread is indifference to civil liberty.

Barber argues that Jihad is committed to bloody politics of identity
whereas McWorld is a bloodless pursuit of profitability. 0 6 Jihad
reacts against the homogenization of culture by fighting global
business and, as Barber makes clear, Jihad's disdain is more with
capitalism than it is with democracy.' 0 7 McWorld has little argument
with democratic institutions, but undermines the community ties
necessary for individuals to understand their connection to the
common good as opposed to a market where self-interest only is the
Moreover, the "twin assault on
necessary consideration. 10 8
democratic citizenship from the fractious forces of Jihad and the
spreading markets of McWorld in effect undercuts democratic
The paradox is that corporations thrive on
institutions."10 9
democratic virtues, but simultaneously undercut them. 110
In response to this paradox, Barber claims that one must rebuild
civil society, including the traditional mediating institutions that
bridge commonly-made distinctions between public and private
life."'
Barber argues that we too often rely on a "two-celled"
distinction between government and the private sector, but the
middle ground of civil society is where we voluntarily come together
to talk about what is necessary for the common good-be it the
softball league, religious outreach, or neighborhood crossing
guards. 112
Unlike governmental affairs, there is no coercion
present-actions are voluntary-but unlike the private sector, there
is concern for the common good. 113 It is in this realm, populated by
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similar to republican virtues, but present a series of issues. For example, can
commerce thrive without stability? More deeply, if respect for contracts and property
is a central requirement for capitalism to flourish, is not the market dependent upon
things like the rule of law, which arise in a manner more complex than via economic
rationality? And if stability and the rule of law are nourished by democratic virtues,
then what can be done if markets undermine notions of citizenship? See BARBER,
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schools, churches, public interest groups, and other civic
organizations, where citizenship is developed. 114
That space,
however, has been squeezed, as corporations encroach on the space of
civil society, as governments react to check the rise of corporate
power, and as individuals begin to think of themselves as consumers
115
rather than citizens.
Barber's analysis begs the question, however, of whether
business is part of civil society. Barber suggests that the answer is
no, noting that it may be unfair to ask a corporation to be committed
to a vision of justice or democracy. 116 He argues instead that
businesses wade into political issues if only to create a middle class
that can purchase their goods. 117 Businesses, he argues, are not
designed to do what democratic polities do--they are contractual
rather than communitarian. 118
Yet, this account misses two
important points.
First, although markets may not be designed to create
democratic polities, businesses draw people to work for them and
invest in them, usually on a voluntary basis. In doing so, they
require people to work together for a common good, even if that good
is simply profitability. Profitability does not occur without significant
practices of human cooperation within the organization.
Thus,
businesses have the essential features Barber recognizes as
emblematic of civil associations." 19
Second, Barber follows Edmund Burke in arguing that human
solidarity is formed by "resemblances, by conformities, by
sympathies" rather than by contracts. 120
Yet, experimental
psychological testing shows that association can be as arbitrary as
whether a person has a dot on his or her nose. 121 In other words,
human solidarity is not trapped by ethnic, religious, or genetic
characteristics, but by any kind of affiliation, which could include
people of differing ethnic origins working together. 122 The so-called
private sector is not as private as one might think and within a
business organization lies the potential, even the necessity, for
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working together for some common good. Thus, while Barber argues
that the reinvigorizing of a variety of mediating institutions in society
would be worthwhile, we also emphasize that business institutions
themselves possess resources for encouraging individuals to exercise
voice in working for a common good. 123 The freedom to exercise voice
entails a need to tolerate dissent; otherwise only a narrow range of
voices will be heard. Within this exercise of voice and toleration of
dissent lay the seeds for a business organization to foster a sense of
This does not mean that
democracy within its own borders.
businesses always or even frequently actualize this potential. Yet,
the potential is there. Governance regimes are not far from
supporting that actualization, and the steps necessary to actualize
that potential lie in a commitment of business to peace. That
commitment not only breeds the stability on which business thrives,
but also lays the groundwork for democratic republics to rise. If
multinational corporations in democratic countries do this, they may
have provided a way to overcome challenges raised against them by
124
appealing directly to the source of democratic liberal tradition.
2. The Huntington Thesis and the Spillover Effects of Corporate
Behavior
In his book, The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington, like
Bobbitt, argues that the end of the Cold War has triggered a new
balance of power among state actors. 125 The Cold War, he argues,
was able to submerge the ambitions for nationhood desired by a
variety of ethnic groups but without the bipolarity of Soviet-U.S.
competition, so that these groups now have a freer reign to pursue
goals of creating their own nation-states. 1 26 These desires are not
new, but the desire to bring all ethnic cousins under one state may
127
spark terrible conflicts including, at the extreme, ethnic cleansing.
Huntington argues that the world will increasingly organize itself
along these lines of identity rather than by nation-state. 128 Thus, the
world will tend to be grouped in terms of North American, South
American, European, Russian, Muslim, Indian, African, Chinese, and
Japanese peoples. 129 As the 1990s Balkans conflicts demonstrate,
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however, not only might there be nation-states in conflict with each
other, but because regions contain differing ethnic groups, there will
also be potential for internal conflict. 1 30 Because Muslims in Egypt
might identify with Muslims in Bosnia and Russians might identify
with Slavs in Serbia, internal conflict can also exacerbate severe
13 1
external tensions.
The location of ethnic linkages around the world is nothing new.
The Balkans have long struggled with this problem, and the presence
of Germans outside of Nazi Germany was one of Hitler's pretexts for
triggering World War 11.132 More benignly, China considers someone
of Chinese heritage (such as an adopted child) as Chinese with an
assumed identification with the Middle Kingdom 133 and the Czech
Republic allows its president to be someone of Czech origin, even if
Globalization, however, fosters additional
not a "citizen."'134
immigration and immigration may further engender domestic
conflicts in the countries to which the immigrants locate. It may also
spark conflicts between the immigrants' home and new countries if it
is perceived either that the emigrees are not being treated well or,
alternatively, that the emigrees are undermining the new country's
identity.
Finally, this has implications for governments. Bobbitt argues
that governments that are able to successfully adapt to new global
conditions are not only successful, but are duplicated by others. 135 As
we have seen, he notes the prevalence of powerful parliamentary
democracies practiced by the United States, Germany, and Japan as
three distinguishable models.' 3 6 If it is true that democracies are
more prone to resolving disputes nonviolently, at least vis-a-vis other
democracies, it may be important for corporations to engage in
practices that contribute to democracy to foster a system that is more
nonviolent than authoritarian alternatives and to provide a model for
countries to emulate. This, in turn, may reinforce commitments to
both democracy and sustainable peace.
The "market-states" of the democratic, liberal tradition are in a
position to engage in the creation of models that link the world
through both democratic principles and economic enterprise, but they
are also in the position to recreate rivalries. To avoid the problems
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Benjamin Barber finds endemic to capitalism and inimical to
democracy, multinational corporations and the states that authorize
their existence through requisite governance regimes must consider
how corporate behavior can enhance, rather than undermine, the
democratic basis on which they are formed.
To make this argument more concretely, we engage in an
analysis of leading, extant corporate governance frameworks in the
United States, Germany, and Japan. These countries account for
over 50 percent of the world's gross product, and if there is to be
leadership in corporate governance along the lines we propose, it will
likely be through these countries.
The universe of the largest
corporations of the world is primarily populated by firms belonging to
one of these three economies. 137 Moreover, the governance systems of
Germany, Japan, and the United States have substantial spillover
effects beyond their respective borders. 138 Many countries in Europe,
such as Austria, Belgium, Hungary, and to a lesser extent, France
and Switzerland, and much of Northern Europe evolved their
governance systems along Germanic, rather than Anglo-American,
lines. 139
The spillover effects are also evident in Asia, where
Japanese firms have been the largest direct foreign investors during
the past decade. 140
Variants of the Anglo-American system of
governance are evident in countries such as the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 14 1 Given these significant
spillover effects, it becomes important for these models to evolve in
such a way so that they may confront violent threats to them
collectively, and provide economic innovation to make them
instruments of sustainable peace. The following Section considers the
current regimes.
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III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Corporate governance has been defined as a top management
process that, when operating correctly, should manage value creation
and value transference among various corporate claimants in a way
that ensures accountability toward those claimants. 142 Claimants
can be broadly defined to include all of those with a stake in corporate
operations, including shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers,
creditors, and the local community. 14 3 This definition emphasizes
both efficiency and fairness.
There are different ways to approach issues of corporate
governance. In the United States, dating at least back to 1919 and
the famous case of Dodge v. Ford,144 the approach has been a model
that has focused primarily on the shareholder, the residual claimant
of the corporate form. In Dodge, the court specifically stated that a
"business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders."' 14 5 In other regimes, such as Germany and
Japan, the interests of society and employees have historically been
the first focal point. All three regimes have had both prosperous as
well as trying times.
This Part examines these three models in the context of a search
for incorporating the goal of peace into local corporate governance
thinking. Although all models, in some way or another, consider
interests of various constituencies, including society at large, these
models do not focus on the goal of peace itself as a general aspiration.
We propose that consideration of peace as a goal is not a far stretch
from what the regimes are already doing, and has the potential for
far-reaching effects not only for society at large, but also for business
itself.

142.
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A. CorporationGovernance Regimes of Competing Market-State
Models
1. The U.S. Model
First and foremost, throughout U.S. history, corporate
governance has focused on the rights of shareholders. 146 The concern
in the United States has been fear that, because of separation of
ownership from control that exists in large-scale corporations, there
is the possibility that management will act in its own self-interest to
the detriment of the firms' owners. 147 To address this concern, the
law has imposed fiduciary duties on corporate officers and directors,
including the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 148 The fiduciary
14 9
duties are said to run to the corporation and its shareholders.
These duties require corporate officers and directors to exercise the
degree of care in the conduct of corporate affairs as the reasonably
diligent person would exercise in similar circumstances, as well as to
act in good faith and in the "honest belief that the action taken is in
the best interests of the corporation."' 150 They also require officers
and directors to put corporate interests ahead of personal interests,
avoiding conflicts of interest. 1 51
Shareholder protection is a
paramount objective expressed in the legal realm of corporate
governance. 152
The U.S. model is, however, multi-faceted. According to the
American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance,
even if corporate profit is not enhanced, corporations may also take
into account "ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business.' 1 53 A corporation
may attain this objective by "devot[ing] a reasonable amount of
resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and
philanthropic purposes."'1 54 Most states endorse this position by
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statutorily permitting corporations to take into account the interests
of various stakeholders when making corporate decisions. The New
York statute, for example, expressly provides that interests of other
constituencies, including current employees, retired employees,
customers, and suppliers, can be considered when making corporate
decision. 155 Connecticut even requires that the interests of other
1 56
constituencies be taken into account in decision-making.
Connecticut appears to be somewhat of an aberration, though,
because most states simply permit rather than require these
considerations. 157
Yet, the stakeholder constituency statutes are not without
controversy. On their face, they appear to promote goals of corporate
social responsibility, even if the goal of shareholder gain might not be
served. As such, they have come under fire. 158 Some commentators
prefer a more-direct anchor to shareholder interests.
Nicholas
Wolfson, 159 Oliver Williamson, 160 James W. Walker, Jr.,16 1 and James
D. Cox 1 62 have expressed this view, criticizing, in particular, the ALI
approach. According to Wolfson, there is no empirical support for the
ideas in the ALI model, and inclusion of these other objectives
compromises efficiency and invites various tradeoffs. 163 Perhaps even
more troubling is M.J. Pritchett, III's argument that the ALI's
optional approach might give management a free reign to promote its
1 64
own self-interest under the guise of promoting social responsibility.
The U.S. approach to corporate governance is an approach based
in shareholder primacy, but with a fair amount of built-in flexibility.
That is, although shareholders still appear to be the most important
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(1984).
161.
James W. Walker, Jr., Comments on the ALI Corporate Governance Project,
9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 580, 580 (1984).
162.
James D. Cox, The ALl, Institutionalization,and Disclosure: The Quest for
the Outside Director'sSpine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1212, 1212-13 (1993).
163.
Wolfson, supra note 159.
164.
M.J. Pritchett III, Comment, Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance:
A Critique of the ALI Statement on Corporate Governance Section 2.01(b), 71 CAL. L.
REV. 994, 1001, 1007 (1983). Others have criticized the ALI Project for opposite
reasons. These detractors contend that the ALI approach simply articulates current
business practice and is thus unnecessary. See, e.g., Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the
Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511,
514 (1984).
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constituent, the interests of other constituencies are significantly
recognized.
In furtherance of the goal of providing value to shareholders,
corporate law in the United States puts a great deal of emphasis on
removing any hint of bias on the part of corporate directors. 165 This
has manifested itself in the increasing popularity of the "independent
66
director."1
Irrespective of the arguments surrounding the weight U.S.
corporate boards can place on stakeholder interests, the U.S.
shareholder primacy model has created a corporate governance
system that values transparency and disclosure. These values of
transparency and disclosure are evident in both the federal and state
securities laws and federal insider trading rules.
Federal and state securities laws are based on the premise that
shareholders are entitled to full and fair disclosure regarding the
nature of their investments. To effectuate full and fair disclosure, the
federal securities regime, pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933167
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,168 requires corporations to
disclose all significant aspects of their business before they may issue
securities to the public. 169 The Securities Act of 1933 mandates this
disclosure by requiring any corporation wishing to sell its securities
to the public to register its securities with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 170 As part of the registration process, the
corporation must prepare a prospectus, which discloses to potential
1
investors the material aspects of the corporation's business. 17
Information disclosed in the prospectus includes not only the price of
the securities to be sold, but also detailed financial information about
the corporation. 172 The corporation must also disclose information
concerning its management and key shareholders. 1 73 After a
corporation's securities have been registered, the duty to disclose
information continues on an annual basis 174 or in the event of a major

165.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2002); Alpert v. 28 St. Williams
Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984).
166.
See Grover C. Brown et al., Director and Advisor Disinterestness and
Independence Under Delaware Law, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1157 (1998).
167.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2002).
168.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh (2002).
169.
Id.
170.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e).
171.
See id.; Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2002).
172.
Id. § 229.200, 229.300.
173.
Id.
174.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(1) (requiring the annual filing of a
Form 10-K that discloses much the same information as required in the Securities Act
registration).
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change within the corporate structure. 175 If the corporation decides
not to sell its securities in a public offering-but instead in a private
transaction-registration
is not necessary, but in certain
circumstances the corporation must still make similar disclosures to
the purchasers of its securities. 1 76 To supplement the federal rules,
each state has its own disclosure rules concerning the sale of a
177
corporation's securities within the boundaries of its state.
Strict penalties for noncompliance attempt to ensure that U.S.
corporations take these disclosure and transparency rules seriously.
A corporation that issues securities under a registration statement
containing omissions or material misstatements exposes its officers,
directors, underwriters, and certain experts to civil liability. 178 In
addition, a corporation can be liable in the form of damages for any
loss sustained by a purchaser of securities issued under a registration
statement with omissions or material misstatements. 179 In certain
circumstances, a corporation may also be subject to criminal fines and
penalties. 18 0
The ban on insider trading also highlights the importance U.S.
corporate governance
regimes place on transparency
and
disclosure.' 8 ' The purpose of insider trading rules is to prevent any
person from selling securities based on material, nonpublic
information. 8 2 The classic case of insider trading arises when a
corporate insider buys or sells shares of the corporation using
confidential information obtained through the insider's corporation
position and, as a result, earns a profit or avoids a loss. i8 3 Federal
common law has expanded the notion of insider trading, however, to
include "outsider trading." Outsider trading occurs when a corporate
insider learns that his firm (or a related firm) will do something that
affects the value of another corporation's stock and trades using this

175.
Id. (requiring the filing of a Form 8-K disclosing specified events such as
bankruptcy, merger, or a director's controversial resignation).
176.
See Rule 502(b)(2) (requiring an issuer selling to any non-accredited
investors in 505 or 506 exempt transactions to furnish its most recent annual report
and any subsequent Exchange Act filings, along with a brief description of the
particular offering; otherwise, the disclosure requirements vary with the size of the
offering).
177.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 7301-30 (2002).
178.
See SEC. ExCH. ACT R. 10b-5.
179.
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.S. § 771(a)(1) (2001).
180.
Id. § 77(x) (2001) (penalties); Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.S.
Appx. § 2Bi.1 (2001).
181.
See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
182.
This is should be compared with the absence of a duty of candor by
corporate insiders to shareholders in anonymous trading markets as explained in
Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933) (rejecting a duty of insiders to
shareholder except in face-to-face dealings).
183.
See O'Hagan v. United States, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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information. 184
Thus, insider trading emphasizes the notion of
disclosure by imposing on corporate insiders the duty to "abstain or
disclose.' 18 5 As part of this duty to "abstain or disclose," a corporate
insider who possesses confidential information must either abstain
86
from trading or disclose the information to the investing public.'
Failure to adhere to federal insider trading rules subjects the trader
87
to liability under the Securities and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.1
Indeed, the emphasis on transparency and disclosure has been
reaffirmed in light of the corporate accounting scandals of 2002 and
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, the implications of
which for corporate governance have yet to be determined.
2.

The German Model

The corporate governance model in Germany emanated from
very different roots than the U.S. model. German corporate law, as
originally enacted in 1935, did not mention the shareholder as a
constituency to be served by the corporation. Instead, it provided
that "[t]he managing board is, on its own responsibility, to manage
the corporation for the good of the enterprise and its retinue
(Gefolgschaft), the common weal of the folk (Volk) and realm demand
(Reich).' 8 8
It was not until 1965 that shareholders were
mentioned.' 8 9 Shareholders are only one of many constituencies
served by the German corporate form. 190
Unlike in the U.S. model, the constituency of employees appears
to have some prominence in the German corporate governance model.
Firms with more than 500 employees are required to utilize a two-tier
board structure, with a supervisory board providing oversight and
general corporate strategy, and a management board providing a dayto-day management oversight function. 19 1 If the firm has more than
2,000 employees, 50 percent of the supervisory board members must
consist of employee representatives. 1 92 The remaining 50 percent of

184.

Id.

185.
See Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
186.
See Dirks v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 436 U.S. 646 (1983).
187.
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2002).
188.
Bradley, et al., supra note 137, at 52; Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the
'Modern' Corporation: Perspectivesfrom the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 40 (1966)
(parentheticals added).
189.
Vagts, supra note 188, at 40-41.
190.
Id.
191.
Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 52.
192.
Id. at 53 (indicating that the other 50% of the supervisory board consists of
shareholder representatives).
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the members consists of shareholder representatives. 193
The
management board consists almost entirely of the senior
management of the company. 194 Board members tend to possess
technical skills related to the product, in addition to considerable
firm- and industry-specific knowledge. 195 This is because careers are
often built up from the ground level and are focused on building
asset-specific skills through extensive apprenticeship systems. 196 The
result of the two-tiered board structure is explicit representation of
employee interests-no major decisions are made without the input
employee representatives. 1 9 7
This is in stark contrast to the
structure of corporate boards in the United States where the board
structure is single-tier and labor has no specific right of
representation.' 98 In fact, board members in the United States are
required to act in the best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders and thus may not specifically represent any particular
constituency. 199
Banks play a large role in German corporate governanceapproximately 14 percent of corporate shares in Germany are owned
by banks. 200 More importantly, a substantial portion of equity is in
the form of bearer, rather than registered stock, 201 and these shares
are left on deposit with the Hausbank of the corporation, which
handles dividend payments and record keeping. 20 2 German law
grants banks a proxy right to vote in connection with these shares,
20 3
It
unless depositors explicitly instruct banks to do otherwise.
'' 20 4
appears inertia "work[s] in favor of banks having proxy votes.
The
power that banks hold in German corporations is compounded by the
provision in many company charters that disallow non-bank

193.
Id.
194.
Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in an InternationalPerspective: A
Survey of Corporate Control Mechanisms Among Large Firms in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany, in BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

ECONOMIC PAPERS NO. 41, 43 (July 1994).
195. Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 2.05 (2001); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, §§ 141(b) (2002); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 606 (2002).
199.
See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30 (2001); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 141, 144 (2001).
200.

ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY 88

(1995) [hereinafter OECD GERMANY].
201.
MITSUHIRO FUKAO, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 27 (1999).

202.
203.
204.

See OECD GERMANY, supra note 200, at 95.
FUKAO, supra note 201, at 27.
Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 54.
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shareholders to exercise more than five to ten percent of the total
20 5
votes, regardless of the proportion of shares they own.
The role of the bank in German corporate governance is also
strengthened by financing patterns. German companies, taken as a
whole, are more leveraged than their U.S. counterparts.2 0 6 Moreover,
instead of relying on public debt financing, German companies
finance their debt through bank or intermediated loans. 20 7 Bank
financing of long-term debt has averaged around 50 percent, and this
percentage has remained fairly stable throughout the past two
208
decades.
Creditor interests are also protected through corporate
governance regimes. 20 9 Dividend payout rules are designed to protect
creditor interests. 21 0 German law stipulates that dividends may not
be paid out from paid-in capital, even if the paid-in capital includes a
premium over the face value of equity. 21 1

This provision makes it

difficult for German corporations to undertake share repurchases, 212
and consequently, also makes it difficult for German shareholders to
cash out of the corporation. 213
The incorporation of other stakeholder interests in corporate
decision-making affects governance issues like management
compensation. Unlike in the United States, the shareholders must
approve the compensation of German board members. 214 This
approval affects the amount and structure of compensation. In 1997,
CEOs of listed German companies earned about half of what their
U.S. counterparts earned, 215 and their compensation usually took the
form of fixed salaries and bonuses. 216 Providing stocks or stock
options as part of top-management's compensation packages is still
21 7
fairly rare.
Compared to U.S. firms, the quality of disclosure in German
firms is poor. 218 The legal and regulatory framework for disclosure is
considered relatively lax compared to that in the United States. 219

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
See FUKAO,
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

FUKAO, supra note 201, at 27.
Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 54.
Prowse, supra note 194, at 94.
See OECD GERMANY, supra note 200, at 93.
German bankruptcy law is also skewed toward protecting creditor interest.
supra note 201, at 123.
Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 55.
FUKAO, supra note 201, at 120.
Id.
See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 54.
FUKAO, supra note 201, at 46.
KEVIN J. MURPHY, 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS tbl. 4 (1999).
Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 53.
Id.

218.

Id. at 55.

219.

Id.
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An OECD survey of disclosure quality states that, as of 1989, none of
the German firms in their sample had complied fully with OECD
disclosure guidelines. 220 Similarly, until recently, Germany had no
insider-trading laws; if insider trading was discovered, the penalty
221
was simply to turn over the profits.
3. The Japanese Model
The traditional corporate governance model in Japan has, like
the German model, emphasized protection of employee interests, as
well as creditor interests. There has been little incentive to be
concerned with shareholder value per se. This may be due in large
part to Japan's corporate ownership structure. Historically, firms in
Japan have been networked in the form of keiretsus, groups of firms
that own reciprocal, minority interests in each other. 222 Although the
firms in keiretsus are usually independent, they to have relational
and implicit contracts with each other on matters such as ownership,
223
governance, and commercial contracts.
Like Germany, banks also play a significant role in Japanese
corporate governance structures. 2 24 For example, a large main bank
that conducts business with all of the member firms and holds
minority equity positions in each will be a member of a horizontal
keiretsu.2 25 Although a single bank is not allowed to hold more than
five percent of a single firm's stock, a group of four or five banks
typically may control between 20 and 25 percent of the company's
stock. 226
More importantly, the corporation's largest bank
shareholder is often the largest creditor.2 27 Thus, the interest of the
shareholder is in effect the same as the interest of the creditor.
Banks, as creditors and shareholders, are more concerned about
credit risk than return on the stock investment, and thus are more
interested in long-term growth than short-term profits. Thus, the
interest of the shareholder is in fact aligned with the interest of the

220.
See Prowse, supra note 194, at 29.
221.
Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 56.
222.
Fukao translates keiretsus as "a series of things organized to perform a
function." FUKAO, supra note 201, at 2. For more details on the Japanese keiretsu, see
generally W.

CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS:

THE GLOBAL CONTEST

FOR

CORPORATE CONTROL 54-55 (1991); Erik Berglof & Enrico Perotti, The Governance
Structure of the JapaneseFinancialKeiretsu, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 259 (1994); David Flath,
Shareholdings in the Keiretsu, Japan's Financial Groups, ECON. PERSP., Jan.-Feb.
1991, at 20.
223.
See Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 57.
224.
See Berglof & Perotti, supra note 222.
225.
See KESTER, supra note 222, at 54-55 (describing the workings of a
keiretsu).
226.
FUKAO, supra note 201, at 15.
227.
See id.
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creditor. This proportion has remained fairly stable over the past 15
years, and these closely-held shares rarely, if ever, make it into the
financial marketplace. 228 Japanese corporations are also typically
more leveraged than corporations in the United States. The largest
bank shareholder also is usually the largest debtholder in the
229
company.
Quite apart from the lending and the direct intervention roles
they play, banks also may facilitate the governance process. They are
likely to have a great deal of access to inside information and hence
can perform a monitoring role very effectively. 230
Given the
governance role of the banks, resolution of financial distress is a
much more informal process as compared to the United States. This
is also true in Germany.
In addition to protection of creditor interests, Japanese corporate
governance is also concerned with employee interests. Japan has also
'231
been historically known for the practice of "lifetime employment.
Employees have remained at their firms due to the grant of
responsibility and benefits this has provided. 23 2 The early retirement
age in Japan, at 55, may also contribute to this practice of "lifetime
'233
employment.
The structure of boards in Japan is similar to that in the AngloAmerican system with single-tier boards. 234 However, in terms of
membership, the Japanese board is similar to the German board. A
substantial majority of board members consist of current or former
senior and middle management of the company. 2 35 Fukao notes that
nearly 78 percent of Japanese directors are promoted from among
employees. 23 6
Thus, unlike in the United States, outside
directorships are rare. The one exception to outside directorships is
the main bank. Main bank representatives usually sit on the boards
of the keiretsu firms with whom they do business. 2 37 However, unlike
in Germany, where employees and sometimes suppliers tend to have
explicit board representation, the interest of stakeholders other than

228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
Id.
231.
Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of The Japanese Firm, 28 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1, 11-12 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Essay, Lifetime
Employment: Labor and Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 509 (1999).

232.
See Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A
Proposed CorporateRegime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 587, 630 n.223 (1997).
233.
Gilson & Roe, supra note 231, at 530.
234.
Prowse, supra note 194, at 42.
235.
FUKAO, supra note 201, at 13-14.
236.
Id.
237.
Id. at 25.
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management or banks are not directly represented on Japanese
238
boards.
In addition, management compensation is not a matter for
shareholder approval.
Compensation, including that of top
management, relies on salaries and bonuses. 239 Stocks or stock
options are rarely used as a basis for remuneration. 240
Total
compensation of top managers, including bonuses, is about six to
eight times the compensation of the most highly paid blue-collar
worker and about 17 times that of the average worker. 2 41 A
managerial labor market along U.S. lines, especially for mid-career
242
workers, is thin.
Share ownership in Japan is concentrated and stable. Individual
2 43
share ownership in Japan, like in Germany, has steadily declined.
Thus, in a typical Japanese firm, approximately two-thirds of the
equity is owned by banks, insurance companies, and other
corporations. 244 Internal management styles and control systems in
Japanese firms rely on building long-term, consensus-based
relationships and are characterized by a great deal of informal
interactions, personal relations, and information-sharing among
relatively culturally homogeneous individuals. 245
There is an
apparent reliance on trust, reputation-building, and face-saving
considerations as the basis for contracting, 246 in part because the
corporation is seen by ' its employees as much as a social entity as an
economic entity.247 Companies thus -rely on face-to-face contacts to
resolve issues. 248 Japanese firms in the larger, organized sector of
the economy emphasize lifetime employment and building of human
249
capital by maximizing asset-specific and relation-specific skills.
Lateral inter-functional transfers of managers and horizontal
information flows among functions and departments, both within the
firm and across firms within the network, are common. 250 Upward
mobility within Japanese organizations is carried out through a

238.
239.

Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 58.
OECD GERMANY, supra note 200, at 107 fig. 27.

240.

Id.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See FUKAO, supra note 201, at 17-18.
Id. at 57.
FUKAO, supra note 201, at 12-20.
Bradley et al., supra note 137, at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.

248.

Id.

249.
250.

Id.
Id. at 61.
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process of moving up through a cross-functional spiral rather than
25 1
through a series of promotions within a particular functional area.
Disclosure quality, although considered superior to that of
German companies, is poor relative to that of U.S. firms. Although
there are rules against insider trading and monopolistic practices, the
252
application of these laws is, at best, uneven and inconsistent.
B. CorporateGovernance Regimes and SustainablePeace
1. A Comparative Assessment
It is important to remember that the corporate governance
models of the United States, Germany, and Japan are rooted in
democratic political entities. To frame this in Bobbitt's terms, the
Entrepreneurial, Managerial, and Mercantile Models are embedded
in parliamentary democracies. 253 The question becomes to what
extent the descriptions of the varying regimes raise the concerns
expressed by Barber that corporations themselves tend to undermine
the very democratic virtues that lead to sustainable peace. 254 To
analyze these issues, we compare these alternatives on the basis of
(1) the corporation's sense of citizenship; and (2) the extent to which
corporations equip citizens with voice in the affairs that affect them.
In doing so, a model emerges that suggests that corporations of each
parliamentary democracy might wish to consider (1) the creation of
authentic communities that encourage peace rather than a solipsistic
notion of community; and (2) the opportunities and dangers in
extended beneficial attributes of voice and citizenship to groups not
typically accorded those attributes as well as how these extensions
can best be accomplished.
After sketching these cross-cutting
notions, we propose four contributions corporations can make to
sustainable peace-not in the sense of a universal model for corporate
governance, but as a set of criteria that corporate regimes might
generally aim toward, within the context of their own cultural
histories and realities.

251.
252.
253.

Id.

254.

BARBER,

Id.
BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 219.

accompanying text.

supra note

43,

at 219;

see

also supra notes

104-24

and
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a. Citizenship and Voice
i. Citizenship
For several years, corporate governance scholarship has focused
255
on a debate between contractarian and communitarian approaches.
In an important sense, this debate is related to Barber's concern as to
whether corporations create a McWorld that undermines democratic
values by undermining a sense of citizenship. 256 In a contractarian
paradigm that underscores the U.S. version of the Entrepreneurial
model, notions of citizenship are likely to revolve around legallyenforceable duties, such as obeying laws generally and, more
particularly, obeying those laws that protect investors, including the
257
laws of fiduciary duty, securities laws, and other regulation.
Thus, according to Bobbitt and Barber, the notion of citizenship in
this model is thinner than in other models. 258 Yet, the U.S. variant
on this model has been flexible enough to accommodate various
notions of citizenship, as evidenced by adoption of statutes in a
majority of states that explicitly permit management to consider the
interests of other constituencies in addition to shareholders when
25 9
making decisions.
The notions of citizenship may be more pronounced in the
260
German (Managerial) and Japanese (Mercantile) models, however.
In both models, there is an expectation that corporations serve a
societal good. In Germany, this is explicit in a stakeholder model
that directs the company to be concerned with society generally as
well as employees and creditors. 261 In Japan, this is tied to cultural
notions of solidarity and employee enmeshment with work. 262 In both
regimes, there is a clear understanding that corporations are part of a
greater social fabric and that their duties include maintenance of that
fabric. It would seem that the introduction of a commitment to a
public good, such as sustainable peace could be incorporated into
these models.

255.
See Bradley et al., supra note 137 (providing a comprehensive analysis of
the various arguments for competing styles of contemporary corporate governance).
256.
BARBER, supra note 43, at 223; see also supra notes 105-15 and
accompanying text.
257.
See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (with respect to free-market
arguments from Hayek and Friedman, which focus on the importance of laws).
258.
BOBBIT, supra note 17; BARBER, supra note 43.
259.
See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
260.
See supranotes 60-87 and accompanying text.
261.
See supra note 76-87 and accompanying text.
262.
See supra note 68-83 and accompanying text.
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ii. Voice
The extent to which the key democratic virtue of voice is fostered
also varies according to each model. Although citizenship notions
seem to be more akin to German and Japanese models, the U.S.
model may have greater sensitivity to voice. As we have seen, the
U.S. model emphasizes transparency and disclosure. 26 3 Both equip a
recipient with the capability to exercise voice.
This voice is
particularly important insofar as investors are concerned, but
disclosure and transparency have other significant beneficial effects
with respect to sustainable peace as demonstrated below. 264 They
give other stakeholders information from which they can morepowerfully exercise their own voice, even if it is simply in criticism of
the corporation.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated by the 2002
corporate scandals, the Entrepreneurial Model is not perfect in its
disclosure of information and there is a need for even better
transparency and disclosure. In addition, the scandals highlight
another powerful constituent voice: the voice of management.
Management's voice is also heard strongly in the Mercantile and
Managerial Models. In the Mercantile Model, the strong voice of
management, together with that of other corporate leadership
represented through cross-ownership mediated through creditors
dominates corporate affairs. 26 5 Similarly, the Managerial Model also
emphasizes the voice of creditors and senior management. 266 In
addition, however, the Managerial Model features the institutionallyempowered voice of employees through board representation. 267 Yet,
given the diminished degree of transparency and disclosure in both of
these models, the capability of dissent is minimized. Only a few
individuals have access to the information necessary to exercise voice
meaningfully. 268 Thus, although the Managerial and Mercantile
Models are both more communitarian and thus theoretically more
conducive to a goal of peaceful stability, they lack a central attribute,
of voice, which is essential to stability.

263.
See Bradley et al., supra note 137.
264.
See infra notes 270.77 and accompanying text.
265.
See supra notes 221-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Japanese
version of the Mercantile Model).
266.
See supra notes 188-220 and accompanying text (discussing the German
version of the Managerial Model).
267.
See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text (discussing the German
approach).
268.
See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
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b. Mediating Institutions and Lessons to Counteract Cynicism
i. Mediating Institutions
In previous work, we argued for a blended model of corporate
governance. 269
That model featured enhanced notions of
transparency and disclosure for German and Japanese regimes and a
greater sense of community for the U.S. system. 2 70 Yet a common
problem for each of the regimes, regardless of whether they were
considered to be more communitarian or more contractarian, was the
potential diminishment of the individual in a large society. 271 Indeed,
we began that Article with a comment by Vaclev Havel, where he
notes that both capitalist corporations and socialist plants share the
common problem of being so large so as to dwarf the individual
working for it. 272 This can be true of a large U.S. company, but it can
also be true of an organization that is devoted to the entire nation273
state of Germany or Japan.
In opposition to the model of a corporation as a megastructure,
we proposed the model of business as a mediating institution. The
mediating institution should be small enough so that individuals
interact with others in their organization on an interpersonal basis,
experience the consequences of their actions, and develop their moral
identity. 274 This is not to suggest that corporations be limited in size,
but it is to suggest that corporations might consciously attempt to
structure themselves to have communities within their overall
corporate structure. 275
Such a model could preserve and even
enhance an authentic community identity of the corporation while at
the same time also require the kind of transparency and disclosure
that supports voice. 276 Moreover, as discussed below, anthropologists
have found that the traits of mediating institutions-relatively small,
face-to-face interactions, reduced hierarchy and consensual decision-

269.
See generally Fort & Schipani, supra note 142.
270.
Id.
271.
Id.
272.
Id.
273.
See id. (arguing that large communities can inhibit the capacity of an
individual to feel that she makes an authentic contribution to the welfare of that
community).
274.
Id.
275.
See id. (arguing for the need of relatively small groupings within the
corporation to address the human need for relatively small groups).
276.
See generally id. (arguing that such a corporate structure might serve as
the best of all possible worlds).
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making-are all attributes of peaceful societies. 2 77 Thus, a model of
communities within corporations is a potential model for peaceful
societies.
ii. Lessons to Counteract Cynicism
In another article in this volume, Professor Dana Muir discusses
the history of employee-benefit programs as related to issues
surrounding peace. 27 8 Muir notes that employee-benefit programs
have been championed as a way to mitigate some of the harshness of
capitalism so that employees believed that they were participants in
the system rather than exploited by it. 279 Muir traces this hope in
the United States and in other countries, and suggests that such
programs offer some degree of participation that fosters harmony
over competition. 28 0 Yet, she also warns that superficial programsthose that promise employee involvement, participation, and voice,
but do not deliver-can sow the seeds of cynicism. 28 1 This potential
problem exists, for instance, in employee programs where putative
employee stock owners do not have the right to vote the stock they
28 2
own.
Professor Muir's warnings are apt for any extension of benefits to
a group not traditionally having them. The extension of a right to
those who otherwise have not had it may engender as much suspicion
as gratitude. Thus, if the promise of voice, participation, ownership,
transparency, disclosure, or other attributes that appear to be
beneficial to harmonious relationships is not fulfilled, there is a risk
of increasing cynicism and distrust. At the same time, Muir's
analysis shows that there are models that could prove to be beneficial
to connecting business and peace.
c. Comparative Assessment
From the foregoing analysis, it does not appear that there is
anything inherently problematic about connecting corporate
governance and sustainable peace. Although maximizing shareholder
value is clearly an important, overriding goal, Anglo-American law
allows for consideration of non-shareholder constituents, Japanese
law provides room for concern for the social aspect of work, and

277.
See supra note 256
anthropologist David Fabbro).
278.
Muir, supra note 16.
279.
Id.
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German law is concerned for employee and social welfare in business
management. 283 Although questing for sustainable peace may sound
idealistic, it is also a goal that benefits corporations themselves by
providing them with more stable and peaceful societies in which to
operate. Thus, there is a plausible long-term reason for businesses to
have an interest in sustainable peace. To be sure, it would be even
more conducive to making this goal a widely-endorsed corporate goal
if extant governance regimes were to specify their legitimacy. Yet,
even without legal change, corporations can adapt current practices
to integrate the goal of sustainable peace into their practices.
This quest will require some adaptation of corporate governance.
We propose four ways in which corporations might thus be able to
This proposal is not made in
contribute to sustainable peace.
definitive terms, and is not presented as a proven mechanism for
achieving sustainable peace. Instead, our ambition is to sketch a
plausible way for corporations to contribute to sustainable peace in
light of existing evidence.
2. A Proposed Model of Corporate Action
As we have suggested in this Article and developed more fully in
previous work, there is a plausible, conceptual relationship among
the role of business, business ethics, and sustainable peace. 284 The
gist of this argument is that through economic progress and
mitigation of rivalries in the workplace, multinational corporations
can contribute to sustainable peace. 28 5 Businesses can do this by:
development,

particularly

for

the

(1)

economic
fostering
marginalized;

(2)

adopting external evaluation principles, such as transparency,
and supporting a legal system that enforces those principles, i.e,.
a "rule of law";

(3)

nourishing a sense of community both within the company and
in the areas in which the company is located; and

(4)

mediating potentially-conflicting parties and redirecting those
parties toward a common goal, even if that goal is only that of
profitability.

We wish to sketch this model conceptually and illustrate the themes
with examples from actions taken by specific companies. In doing so,
we are not suggesting that these attributes be uncritically accepted as
There is, however,
a model for peaceful corporate governance.
evidence to show connections between these characteristics and

283.
284.
285.

See Fort & Schipani, supra note 142.
See generally Fort & Schipani, supra note 15.
Id.
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sustainable peace, and to suggest that corporate governance regimes,
attentive to the comparative concerns already raised, may be able to
28 6
integrate these characteristics in culturally-appropriate ways.
a. Fostering Economic Development
The first thing companies can do to help work toward the goal of
peace is what they do best: foster economic development. A recent
World Bank report showed a highly positive correlation between
underdevelopment and violence. 28 7
Intuitively, this correlation
makes sense: in an environment of extremely scarce resources,
competition for the necessities of life could lead to conflict that could
turn violent. Although critics of globalization often downplay the
economic advantages corporations bring with them to country, there
are a number of ways in which corporations contribute to more stable
societies.
The first contribution that corporations make toward stability is
in providing jobs to residents of the country. For instance, Frigorifico
Canelones, a division of Land O'Frost and recognized by the U.S.
Secretary of State as a winner of the Award for Corporate
Excellence, 28 8 turned a bankrupt meat processing plant into a

286.
Id.
287.
Post-Conflict Unit of the World Bank, Security, Poverty Reduction and
Sustainable Development: Challenges for the New Millennium 4-11 (Sept. 1999)
(assessing the links between poverty and violence).
288.
The criteria for the Secretary of State's Award for Corporate Excellence are:
*

Maintaining good corporate citizenship by engaging in ethical
business practices, maintaining the integrity of the company, and
dealing with consumers in accordance with fair business practices.

•

Displaying exemplary employment practices and a fair opportunity
for trade unions to represent employees as well as avoiding
discrimination based on race, gender or ethnicity.

*

Creating a healthy workplace environment for all workers. This
includes working for the effective abolition of child labor and forced
labor practices as well as maintaining a working environment
equal to, if not exceeding, comparable local industry standards of
health and safety.

*

Conducting business with an astute consciousness of local,
national, and global environmental concerns. This includes the
collection and ongoing monitoring of useful information regarding
the environmental, health, and social impacts of operations. Also,
working with local, national, and international officials to
adequately communicate to the public regarding potential
environmental and health issues without compromising the
business's integrity and ability to operate successfully.
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profitable Uruguayan operation. 289 The resulting 800 jobs, in a town
with no other major employer, provided economic development to an
impoverished area. 290 The same kind of experience holds true in
Malaysia where Motorola, also an Award winner, invested $1.1 billion
and employed more than 8,000 people, 291 as well as in Ethiopia
through the work of F.C. Schaffer & Associates, a small Louisiana
292
sugar company employing 7,000 people.
The second corporate contribution results from the benefits they
For example, Frigorifico
can provide to the local population.
Canelones supports training and educational programs for homeless
293
and abused youth, as well as recreational programs for children.
Ford Motor Company, also a winner of the Award for Corporate
Excellence, sponsors AIDS-related programs in Africa, working with
local health care authorities. 294 Xerox, which won an Award in 1999,
not only contributes to programs for children, but also addresses
another stakeholder group-employees--by providing counseling
programs designed to help lift people out of poverty in Brazil. 295 In
29 6
addition, it offers space in its facilities for local cultural activities.

Contributing to the overall growth and development both
economically and socially of the local society. This includes workspecific skills training, general academic improvement, and
opportunities for personal self-improvement, as well as other
programs, services and philanthropic endeavors for the local public,
all aimed at providing a base for growing and sustaining an
increased quality of life.
"

Endeavoring to ensure that business activities are compatible with
the science and technology policies of the countries and, as
appropriate, contribute to the development of local innovative
capacity.

*

Developing and maintaining a healthy respect for the local,
national, and international authority. This includes rejecting the
practices of bribery, extortion, illegal tax exemption, and favoritism
in favor of creating a fair and open marketplace beneficial to all.

U.S. Dep't of State, Award for Corporate Excellence 2001: Criteria, available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/bs/ace.
289.
U.S. Dep't of State, 2000 Award for Corporate Excellence, Frigorifico
Canelones, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/bs/ace.
290.
Id.
291.
U.S. Dep't of State, 2000 Award for Corporate Excellence, Motorola
Malaysia, availableat http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/bs/ace.
292.
U.S. Dep't of State, 1999 Award for Corporate Excellence, F.C. Schaffer &
Associates, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cbalbs/ace.
293.
Frigorifico Canelones, supra note 289.
294.
U.S. Dep't of State, 2001 Award for CorporateExcellence, Ford, available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/bs/ace
295.
U.S. Dep't of State, 1999 Award for Corporate Excellence, Xerox, available
at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/bs/ace
296.
Id.
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The third contribution relates to resource transfer. This transfer
could be in technological development or development of human
managerial capabilities, or both.
Motorola's work in Malaysia
exemplifies both features of this dimension. By building a high-tech
manufacturing plant, it provides technological know-how to the
Malay people, 297 which itself provides a foundation for additional
economic development.
Moreover, the managers of Motorola's
facilities are not expatriates, but citizens of Malaysia, 298 thereby
managerial skills are transferred to the country as well.
F.C.
Schaffer & Associates exhibits these characteristics with a bit of a
novel twist. After devastating floods racked Ethiopia, the company
299
shared its expertise in running sugar refineries with competitors.
It continues to provide consulting services for the design of co30 0
generation, environmentally safe power plants.
A fourth contribution is the simple task of paying taxes. The
benefit to society provided by tax revenues, however, is dependent on
the quality of the government collecting the taxes and the use made
of them. Assuming just governmental regimes, tax revenues may be
quite beneficial in helping to provide a much-needed infrastructure.
If a key factor in violence is the desperation produced by
marginalization, then the work of companies such as these avoids
exploitation. These companies have built local capacities while also
being profitable.
Ethics scholar Michael Santoro has argued that
there is a difference between companies that exploit low-wage
economies by creating sweatshops as a cost-minimization strategy
and others that adopt a market-building strategy. 30 1 The first is
more likely to sow the seeds of resentment.
The second is a
contribution to the welfare of the countries in which companies do
their work.
b. Adopting External Evaluation Principles
With modern communications technology, it is difficult for any
company to be immune from the potential glare of publicity and
investigative reporting. Some companies welcome transparency. To
be transparent is to be willing to have your actions evaluated by
others. Although not all transparency is universally good-there are,
after all balances that need to be struck between transparency and

297.
U.S. Dep't of State, 2000 Award for Corporate Excellence, Motorola,
available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/bs/ace.
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privacy-accountability to external standards may contribute to a
social environment where violence is less likely to occur. Two aspects
of transparency are particularly worth noting: transparency with
respect to corruption and support of a rule of law.
In previous research, we conducted an analysis of whether there
is a connection between corruption and violence. 30 2 We compared the
ranking of countries by Transparency International (TI) in its
Corruption Perception Index with the Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research's index related to conflict around the
world. 30 3 The Corruption Perception Index is based on interviews
with approximately 770 managers and other business people about
the extent to which corruption is endemic in a country in which they
work. 30 4 The Heidelberg Institute keeps track of conflicts that occur
within a country and evaluates them according to whether they are
handled in a nonviolent or violent way. 30 5 The assessment tracks 28
different attributes and also provides a four-part characterization of
whether disputes are handled mostly violently, somewhat violently,
30 6
somewhat nonviolently, and mostly nonviolently.
The results were striking. Countries in the top quartile of the TI
index-that is, those countries that were the least corrupt-resolved
disputes by violence 14 percent of the time. 30 7 Those in the second
quartile resolved disputes by violence 26 percent of the time. 30 8 The
third quartile resolved disputes by violence 44 percent of the time and
those in the bottom TI quartile, that is the most corrupt, resolved
disputes by violence 60 percent of the time. 30 9 These findings are
correlative, not causative. Yet, it is possible that poverty may
If so, then
contribute to corruption that leads to violence.
underdevelopment may be more of a root cause to violence than
corruption per se. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how more corruption
will help a social situation.
John Noonan, an expert in the study of bribery, once noted that
bribery is typically hidden unless the leaders are so brazen and
secure in their power that they can flaunt their corruption. 3 10 That
which is hidden, by tautology, is not subject to external evaluation.
In fact, the goal of the efforts of TI is to publicize incidents of

Fort & Schipani, supra note 15, at 398.
302.
Id.
303.
304.
Transparency International, The 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index,
available at http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi2O0O/cpi2OOO.html.
305.

CONFLICT
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

HEIDELBERG

INSTITUTE

FOR

INTERNATIONAL

CONFLICT

BAROMETER 2002 (2002), at http:lwww.liik.delen/indexe.htm.
Id.
Fort & Schipani, supra note 15, at 398.
Id.
Id.
See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES (1984).

RESEARCH,

420

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:377

corruption.3 11 Keeping corruption hidden denies the opportunity to
raise meaningful objections to the practice. As ethicists Thomas
Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee have argued, keeping bribery hidden
skews efficient distribution of resources because decisions are not
made on the basis of a merit that can be publicly evaluated and
justified, but on the basis of a kind of power that is immune from
evaluation.3 12 Corruption stifles the voice of people evaluating the
action.
No one company is going to solve a country's corruption
problems. Yet, companies can try to limit the corruption endemic to a
country, and also work to try to change the enforcement of laws so
that anti-bribery laws are effective.
Indeed, this is the
313
recommendation of the OECD to promote efficient markets.
Moreover, if there is also a correlation between corruption and
violence, then the cause of peace could be beneficially supported by
corporate efforts to limit or eliminate corruption.
This commitment to support laws that reduce or eliminate
bribery leads to the second kind of evaluative commitment: support of
the rule of law itself. One of the clear lessons from the emerging
economies of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 is that those
countries that quickly established a commitment to a rule of law,
particularly in contract and property protection, flourished more than
others. Even the free market is not completely free-it requires a
legal and moral infrastructure to work. Devout free marketers such
3 15
as F.A. Hayek 314 and Milton Friedman have acknowledged this.
Perhaps even more interestingly, economist Jane Jacobs has argued
that those countries with strong commercial values, including values
of promise-keeping in contracts, respect for property, and nonviolent,
3 16
negotiated resolution of disputes, tend to be more peaceful.
There are at least three ways in which companies can support a
3 17
rule of law. First, they can comply with legal requirements.

311.
Transparency International, TI Bribe Payers Index and Corruption
Perceptions Index (2002), available at http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html.
312.

THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND 226-30 (2000).

313.
See Miguel Scholoss, Luncheon Address at the Symposium on Fighting
International Corruption & Bribery in the 21st Century, 33 CORNELL J. INT'L L. 469,
478 (2000); see also DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 312.
314.
See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988)

(arguing that the free market depends on legal protection of contracts and property
rights).
315.
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Sept. 13, 1970, at 33 (arguing that the free market is
dependent upon a functioning legal system that restrains some kinds of behavior).
316.
See generally JANE JACOBS, SYSTEMS OF SURVIVAL: A DIALOGUE ON THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMMERCE AND POLITICS (1992).

317.
See supra note 288 and accompanying text (specifying rule of law as a
criteria for the Award of Excellence).
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Unfortunately, not all laws are just. Nevertheless, compliance with
most legal requirements typically yields good results. Second, they
can educate people about what laws are and how they can be useful.
Johnson & Johnson currently operates a program in rural China in
conjunction with the Chinese government and UNICEF that teaches
3 18
healthcare workers about regulations pertaining to childbirth.
This is done with the hope of increasing the knowledge of midwives
and other healthcare providers to improve the quality of medical
services. 319 Thus, by teaching people about law, living conditions can
by improved.
A third way is more controversial. Hernando de Soto has made a
provocative argument claiming that nearly $1.3 trillion lay in the
hands of the very poor around the world. 320 The problem is that the
poor are unable to access those resources because the most valuable
assets are their homes, and the legal title requirements in emerging
countries often do not allow the marginalized to acquire clear title to
their homes. 321 Without title, the poor cannot exercise the most basic
entrepreneurial strategy of taking out a home loan to start a
business. As a result, there is enormous potential that could be
unleashed if certain kinds of property systems-akin to the
Homestead Act in the United States in the early part of its
history 322-are developed. Clearly, this is a legal reform dependent
upon governmental action, but corporations have influence, often
significant influence, in law reform. De Soto's point is that such
reforms would improve the plight of the marginalized, which itself
would be a contribution to stability, and also provide more economic
opportunity as the creative potential of the poor is unleashed. 323 The
market is not a zero-sum game, but one that grows with increased
economic activity.
c. Nourishing a Sense of Community
The neorealist school of foreign policy argues that people are
concerned with filling their needs, including their psychological needs
of security and identity. 324 The post-Cold War era has made this
point painfully on numerous occasions. According to one study, more
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than 90 percent of post-Cold War conflicts have occurred within the
borders of an existing state and the battles have been on the basis of
ethnic, cultural, and religious identity.3 25 Religious historian Scott
Appleby has analyzed fundamentalist religious movements in all
faiths and argues that it is when a group feels threatened-i.e., their
326
security in their identity is at risk-extremism can take hold.
Extremism is not necessarily violent, but it can be.
In a rare cross-cultural study of attributes of peaceful societies,
anthropologist David Fabbro notes that those societies that are
relatively small, have a great deal of face-to-face interaction, allow for
most, if not all, community members to participate in decisions, are
relatively egalitarian (including gender equity), practice nonviolent
resolution of conflicts, and are geographically separated from others
tend to be more peaceful. 327 There is not much that a company can
do to influence geographical separation, but there are things
companies can do to mirror the attributes of peaceful societies.
First, businesses can become genuine communities.
More
specifically, companies can become mediating institutions.
As
Timothy Fort has argued, there are both moral and neurobiological
reasons for why human beings develop their values in relative small
groups-mediating institutions-such as family, neighborhood,
religious groups, and voluntary associations. 32 8 Large bureaucratic
companies do not necessarily lend themselves to being communities,
but creating a sense of connectedness among members of an
organization can provide a sense of security and identity to the people
who work there.
As part of this process, the second thing companies can do is to
encourage the use of voice by those in the company. Having a voice in
the promulgation of rules is a critical, identifying characteristic of a
democracy.3 29 Although subtle, when a company committed to
quality processes, such as Motorola, insists that its employees speak
up when they recognize a product defect, these employees have
learned something about participatory governance, and this
knowledge may spill over into the country itself. This could be

325.

Id. at 9.
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significant because, as noted above, 330 democratic countries rarely, if
ever, go to war with each other.
Finally, a corporation can contribute to the psychological security
and identity of a country by investing in the people of that country.
Earlier, the Motorola example of having its Malay plant run by Malay
managers was noted.33 ' To the extent companies can develop and
empower leaders in the countries where their plants are located, the
less likely, it would seem, that those plants would be seen as
threatening of local culture. This is an area that merits considerably
more research.
d. Mediating Between Potentially Conflicting Parties
States clearly compete for power. We suggest that corporations
can play a role in mediating some of the contests for power between
people for whom either power or security is at stake through what
has become known as "track-two" diplomacy.3 3 2 This can happen in
three ways.
In general, governmental leaders are typically limited in the
people they can talk with in other countries. By diplomatic protocol,
they can only talk to other governmental officials. Not only does this
limit the number of available conversation partners, it limits the
flexibility of negotiations between leaders of countries in the midst of
a dispute. Utilizing track-two diplomacy, an outside party can relay
unofficial messages. 3 33 For instance, New York Times columnist
Thomas Friedman notes that the 2002 nuclear showdown between
India and Pakistan was mitigated, at least in part, by the actions of
General Electric executives impressing on the Indian government the
need to come to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.33 4 Businesses, in
short, can play a role. Governments interested in expanding power
may still bluster at each other, but businesspeople have a perspective
of the security and stability that is in play for a variety of
participants that needs to be factored into political equations. This is
not to suggest that businesspeople become spies for their own
governments. Instead, it suggests that they may provide ways for
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politicians to settle disputes with a minimum amount of social
disruption.
A second kind of track-two diplomacy is that of corporate
citizenship. 33 5 Businesses can be ambassadors for their countries. In
doing so, a more-positive vision of the country may emerge. Much
has been written on the actions that corporations can take in order to
be constructive citizens in their communities. These actions range
from environmental responsibility to respect for human rights to
336
promoting educational opportunities for employees and others.
Within this vast corporate citizenship literature lies a large number
33 7
of examples of constructive corporate involvement.
A third kind of track-two diplomacy might occur in the
workplace. A corporation provides the opportunity for different
people, perhaps even ethnically conflicting, to work together for a
common goal. Sometimes this is explicit; other times it is not. For
instance, Futureways, a company in Ireland, purposely hires both
Protestants and Catholics, in an approximate 1:1 ratio, for its
workforce. 338 Not only do these often-warring populations work
together for the goal of a profitable company, they also talk about
their experiences with each other. A non-business example of the
same philosophy-Seeds of Peace-brings together Israeli and
Palestinian youths to a summer camp in New England each year in
order to demonstrate that "the enemy has a face. ' 3 3 9 People typically
walk away from the experience with the "outgroup member" as being
a person rather than an enemy.3 40 A less explicit example of this
would be a company that simply brings together people from different
groups to work together without necessarily promoting explicit
34 1
discussion of their differences.
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Our argument is not that business should take on some kind of
messianic purpose. Businesses have a primary role in terms of
providing economic growth and opportunity. However, businesses
can choose to pursue that growth in different ways. This research
suggests that business can pursue its work in ways that might
contribute to more stability, more security, and more peace in
societies.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Issues of globalization have been present for many years.
Corporate power has been increasing for decades if not centuries.
Communication technologies allow for relative ease in crossing the
borders of sovereign nation-states, thereby reducing the power of
traditional forms of government. Environmental degradation defies
neat compartmentalization within geographic boundaries. States are
still critically important organizations, but markets and technologies
marking the new millennium present a different set of challenges
than has previously existed.
In a changing environment, those who survive are those who
adapt.
This is a time where adaptation is necessary.
More
specifically, those organizations that have the capability to cross
borders, move markets, connect individuals and cultures, and bring
people to work together have the potential to create either great harm
and anguish or great gains.
Among these organizations are
transnational governmental bodies (NGOs) such as the United
Nations, the World Trade Organization, and many others as well as
NGOs such as the Red Cross or Transparency International. Yet at
the center of the changes impacting the world is the multinational
corporation.
In this Article, we have not argued that corporations have a duty
to adapt their policies to integrate a quest for sustainable peace
among their other financial objectives. Instead, we have suggested
that given the changing world and the potential negative impact
corporations may have on democracy, it is worth pausing to consider
what corporations might be able to do to support a goal of peace. By
incorporating sustainable peace as a business objective, multinational
corporations may be able to blend extant corporate governance
principles with a goal that can significantly contribute to the
reduction of violence in society.
The arguments are, at best, nascent in form.
There is
considerable amount of research that needs to be conducted and
refinement of the ideas we have articulated. In particular, there is a
need for academic scholars as well as members of nongovernmental
organizations to more fully explore the extent to which corporate
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actions have an impact on violence and stability. The reason for this
is a need to sketch out the relationship between corporate action and
sustainable peace. We expect that such research will demonstrate an
indirect connection. That is, certain kinds of societies are more prone
to violence (and stability) and that corporations contribute to the
development of such societies in certain ways.
If this connection can be made, businesses may have a model of
how they can act. And, in fact, there are models of good corporate
citizenship that are already being linked to sustainable peace. These
examples are likely to become important touchstones for other
businesses to emulate and to provide the freedom for businesses to
think more broadly about they might be able to do.
Finally, if there are connections between types of economic
productivity and sustainable peace, there may be pressure on
governments to create incentives for corporations to contribute to
stability by modifying existing governance laws. In the meantime,
enough evidence exists to sketch some things that companies can do
to contribute to peace. That is, they can foster economic development,
remain open to external evaluation of corporate actions, act as good
corporate citizens in the community, be a corporate community in
their own right, and take advantage of opportunities for track-two
diplomacy.

